Governments perpetually align their policies to satisfy shifts in voters'relative demand for economic growth versus social equality. Following such shifts, increases (decreases) in government interventions lower (raise) both inequality and growth.
Introduction
The question whether inequality promotes or hinders economic growth is among the most controversial ones in the …eld of growth and development. In the last 20 years, there has been a growing literature on the subject making use of ever more advanced econometric techniques, but a clear answer seems still elusive. This paper departs from this body of literature and stresses the role of beliefs and cultural factors in the inequality-growth nexus. Standard political economy models assume that a high inequality induces the median voter to support a distortionary redistribution with adverse consequences for growth. This mechanism is supposed to operate in the same way within all countries from Scandinavia to the United States. I examine whether the joint dynamics of inequality, redistribution, and growth within countries di¤er because of their di¤erent cultural background.
This paper claims that governments are adjusting the level of their interventions in the market economy (e.g., redistributive policies) in order to provide both economic growth and social equity demanded by voters. Crucially, the relative demand for these two public goods is not stable over time. In some periods, public focus is on economic growth, and hence liberalizing policies lead to an increase in both growth and inequality. In other periods, equality considerations dominate the political debate, and the resulting surge in regulation and redistribution leads to a decrease in inequality and a worsening of the economic performance.
The …rst point of this study is that the cultural background of countries a¤ects the intensity of the pattern outlined above. The idea of altering the scope of government in order to regulate the level of inequality tends to prevail in egalitarian countries, which for cultural reasons consider inequality unfair. On the contrary, public support for such …ne-tuning will be rather limited in laissez-faire countries, where the electorate views a-uence as a deserved outcome of hard work. As a result, increases of government interventions should be more tightly associated with decreases of both inequality and growth within egalitarian countries. The pattern should be less pronounced within laissez-faire countries, where the trade-o¤ between social equity and economic growth is not the main driving force behind the dynamics of government interventions.
The second point of the paper is that the mechanism would also a¤ect the observed reduced-form relationship between inequality and growth. The increases (decreases) in government interventions namely lead to decreases (increases) in both inequality and growth. Ceteris paribus, this process makes the observed changes in inequality and the observed changes in growth more positively correlated with each other. If the mechanism is stronger in culturally egalitarian countries, one might thus observe a stronger positive co-movement between inequality and growth over time in these countries. Intuitively, countries that consider both inequality and growth as legitimate policy objectives will observe a tighter link between these two.
In order to provide empirical evidence for the patterns outlined above, I employ the data from the World Value Survey. This is a highly used and comprehensive database of social and economic beliefs. I focus on a question that asks the respondents whether success in life depends more on hard work or on luck and connections. One would expect that public demand for egalitarian outcomes is higher in countries where successful people are considered to be lucky rather than hard-working. Alesina stronger belief in luck as the main determinant of success is associated with a higher share of social spending in the GDP. In this paper, I utilize this social belief to empirically test whether the within-country dynamics of government intrusion, inequality, and growth di¤er between egalitarian and laissez-faire countries. I do so in three steps.
First, I tackle the endogeneity issue concerning such surveys. The expressed beliefs re ‡ect both the deep cultural attitudes and the feedback from the real economy. I use the shares of various religious denominations in the population to extract the culturally driven part of economic beliefs in a given country. Religious composition serves here as a proxy for a broader notion of cultural di¤erences across countries. I use the obtained value of culturally determined component of people's attitudes toward social equity to divide the countries into egalitarian and laissez-faire societies.
Second, I present some evidence that the dynamic link between government interventions and either inequality or growth is not equally strong across the two country groups. The changes in inequality and the changes in government interventions are negatively correlated both within laissez-faire and egalitarian countries. The correlation is, however, stronger in the egalitarian group. The di¤erence between mean correlations of the two country groups is both quantitatively important and statistically signi…cant. The correlation of changes in government interventions and economic growth is not signi…cant within laissez-faire countries, but it is negative within egalitarian ones.
Finally, I test whether the above mechanism translates into a stronger positive comovement of inequality and growth within egalitarian countries than within laissez-faire countries. Various panel data estimation techniques capturing the within-country dynamics over time (the …xed e¤ects, the system GMM, and the bias-corrected Least-Square Dummy Variable -LSDVC) con…rm that the coe¢ cient of inequality in growth regressions is indeed signi…cantly higher in egalitarian countries.
After providing the empirical evidence supporting my story, I suggest a possible analytical formalization of the qualitative mechanism in this paper. In particular, I introduce a simple extension into the theoretical framework set out in Alesina and Angeletos (2005) .
In their model, people have a preference for social fairness captured by the notion that one should get what one deserves. Agents support rewarding individual skills and e¤ort but oppose inequality that is based on pure luck. Such a preference for fairness can generate multiple steady states due to complementarity between prevailing beliefs and politicoeconomic outcomes. On the one hand, the US steady state (laissez-faire countries in the terminology of this paper) is characterized by less redistribution and a widespread belief that success in life is the result of hard work. On the other hand, agents operating in the EU steady state (i.e., the population of egalitarian countries) believe that luck determines success in life and therefore support a bigger economic role for the government.
Alesina and Angeletos (2005) focus on the steady state properties of the two equilibria, holding the preference for fairness constant. I introduce an exogenous shock to this preference and examine its economic implications in the egalitarian versus the laissezfaire regime. In egalitarian countries, an increased preference for fairness translates into a higher level of redistribution. In laissez-faire countries, the e¤ect of this preference shock on the redistribution level displays in general a smaller magnitude and has an ambiguous sign. The intuition for this result is simple. In countries where people believe in the injustice of inequality, a positive shock to the preference for fairness transmits directly into a higher demand for redistribution. The same preference shock produces smaller increases or even decreases of government interference in the laissez-faire regime, in which social beliefs equate redistribution to the expropriation of hard-working rich people. In the model, more redistribution leads in turn to a lower inequality and a slower economic growth. The presence of shocks to the preference for fairness would therefore also produce a stronger positive co-movement of inequality and growth within egalitarian countries compared to laissez-faire ones.
These results contribute to two strands of the literature.
First, the results indicate that culture might play an important role in the complex relationship between inequality and growth. This contributes to the empirical work that tries to identify the causal e¤ects of income distribution on economic performance. The renewed interest in this question started with the seminal contributions of Alesina and Rodrik (1994) and Persson and Tabellini (1994) , who provided empirical evidence for a negative e¤ect. The subsequent cross-sectional studies con…rmed this result, but the later use of panel data estimation challenged the emerging consensus. Both Li and Zou (1998) , applying the standard …xed e¤ects estimation, and Forbes (2000) , using the di¤erence GMM approach, found a positive and signi…cant relationship between inequality and growth in the short and medium term. 1 Empirical evidence has remained inconclusive since. Estimations relying on cross-section estimations mostly …nd negative coe¢ cient estimates, while methods focusing on the time-series component of variations (…xed effects, GMM estimation) tend to report a positive link. The longer the chosen growth period, the lower the coe¢ cient of the inequality measure in growth regressions. 2 Given this diverse and sometimes contradictory evidence, subsequent papers applied various and increasingly advanced econometric techniques and tried to identify the possible nonlinearities in the inequality-growth nexus. Barro (2000) uses random e¤ects and 3SLS
estimator and argues that the link is positive for rich countries and negative for poor ones. Banerjee and Du ‡o (2003) employ kernel estimation and suggest that both positive and negative changes in inequality are associated with a lower economic growth.
Voitchovsky (2005) applies the system GMM estimator and …nds evidence for a positive (negative) e¤ect of inequality at the top (bottom) end of the income distribution. This paper o¤ers a fundamentally di¤erent explanation relying on deep cultural characteristics of countries. The presented results indicate that cultural factors could be an important driving force behind the observed evolution of inequality and growth. To my knowledge, this possibility has not been examined so far.
Second, the paper contributes to the emerging …eld of cultural economics. The idea that culture matters for economic outcomes has attracted a lot of attention in recent years.
The interested reader can turn to Tabellini sectional evidence on the link between culture and long-term economic outcomes.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: The next three sections constitute the empirical core of the paper. Section 2 describes the data, Section 3 lays out the econometric methodology, and Section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5 then introduces a simple extension into the theoretical framework of Alesina and Angeletos (2005) , suggesting a possible way for thinking about the mechanism in this paper in a more formal way. Section 6 concludes.
Data
From the data point of view, the crucial task is to …nd a suitable proxy for measuring how The answer to the above question seems determined mostly by deeper cultural con-
victions. Yet it still provides a good proxy for the public beliefs regarding the fairness of income di¤erences. The more widespread the belief that economic success originates in luck rather than in hard work, the more public support for a governmental provision of social equity can be expected. Equally important is to …nd a proper measure of inequality within countries. Until recently, the majority of the papers in the …eld used the inequality dataset compiled by Deininger and Squire (1996) . This source represented a huge improvement in terms of coverage and data quality and hence allowed for the …rst time the use of panel estimation in the inequality-growth context. However, Atkinson and Brandolini (2001) brought forward serious criticism regarding the comparability of those data across countries and over time. I rely therefore on the University of Texas Inequality Project (UTIP) dataset created by James K. Galbraith and associates. 3 In particular, I use their Es-timated Household Income Inequality (EHII) dataset, which exploits the econometric relationship between UTIP-UNIDO data on industrial pay inequality and the extended Deininger-Squire dataset while accounting for di¤erent types of data sources (income versus expenditure, household versus per capita, gross versus net). 4 This approach yields a consistent measure of inequality that allows for a better comparability across space and over time.
The measure for government interventions comes from the Government Size Index by the Fraser Institute and captures government consumption, transfers and subsidies, government enterprises and investment, and top marginal tax rates.
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The remaining variables come from the standard sources. Output (GDP) and investment share in output are from the Penn World Table and educational First, I use this value and construct a dummy variable that divides the countries into equally large groups of egalitarian and laissez-faire societies. I examine whether there is indeed a stronger negative co-movement between government interventions and inequality, as well as between government interventions and growth, within the egalitarian group of countries. This would provide empirical evidence for the economic mechanism of this paper.
Second, I explore whether the culturally determined part of peoples'beliefs matters also in the reduced form relationship between inequality and growth within countries.
On that account, I take both the continuous value of d Belief s c and the dummy variable based on it, and I use them as alternate measures of culture in the growth regressions described in the following subsection.
Culture, Growth, and Inequality
Given the focus on the inequality-growth dynamics within countries, I rely on the panel data regressions that control for country …xed e¤ects. There are at least two other reasons for using the within-country estimation techniques. First, the bulk of recent empirical growth literature seems to agree that controlling for the omitted country-speci…c e¤ects is crucial in the context of growth econometrics. The majority of panel data growth studies therefore rely on within-group estimation rather than on random e¤ects estimation (Durlauf et al. 2005, p. 629 ). This applies to the studies looking at the e¤ects of inequality on economic growth as well. Second, since Forbes (2000) , most of the controversy in the literature on the growth-inequality nexus is associated with …xed e¤ects panel data studies.
The empirical model is represented by the following dynamic speci…cation that controls for …xed e¤ects and has become standard in recent growth literature:
where y represents the level of output, X is a vector of regressors, h t are the time dummies, n c capture the unobserved country-speci…c e¤ects, and v ct is the error term. The subscripts c and t denote country and time, respectively. The length of the time period in the panel data structure is …ve years, as usual in the literature. This relatively low frequency should eliminate short-run business ‡uctuations and is also motivated by data availability. In order to examine the interactions between the cultural background of a country and its internal growth-inequality dynamics, one has to narrow down the general formulation in (2).
In particular, the performed regressions rely on the following speci…cation:
where Culture c captures the culturally determined component of public beliefs about the importance of luck versus hard work in determining income and wealth. I will run two sets of regressions, using the continuous variable d Admittedly, it is virtually impossible to rule out every single bias when examining the e¤ect of culture on economic outcomes on the country level. Nevertheless, the above arguments suggest that at least some of the empirical issues can be addressed by the combination of the cross-sectional "…rst stage" regression and the dynamic panel data estimation techniques described in the next subsection.
Dynamic Panel Data Estimation Techniques
Speci…cation (3) controls for country …xed e¤ects. The OLS estimation will therefore not su¤er from the bias caused by the presence of non-observable country-speci…c factors that can be correlated with included regressors. However, the standard …xed e¤ects estimation takes into account neither the presence of a lagged dependent variable in the dynamic speci…cation nor the potential endogeneity of other explanatory variables. To take care of these two problems, Arellano and Bond (1991) developed an estimator that is now known as the di¤erence GMM estimator. This panel data estimator takes the …rst-di¤erences of (3) and then uses lagged values in levels of variables as instruments. The estimator is consistent if the instruments are valid and the residuals in the …rst-di¤erenced equation display no second-order serial correlation. 6 The advantage of the GMM framework is the possibility for testing the validity of those assumptions. The standard tools for this are the Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions and the Arellano-Bond tests for serial correlation. The di¤erence GMM estimation was …rst applied to examine the inequalitygrowth link by Forbes (2000) .
There are two potential problems with the use of the original di¤erence GMM estimation -over…tting and weak instruments. The …rst problem can occur when the researcher uses all available lagged value as instrumental variables, as was done by Forbes (2000) .
In this case, the number of instruments gets easily too large relative to the size of the cross-section, leading to a …nite sample bias. A natural remedy is to reduce the number of instruments by using fewer lags than available. The second problem is more fundamental. When time series are persistent, the lagged levels of variables will represent only weak instruments for the …rst di¤erences. This leads to both …nite sample bias and weak identi…cation when using the di¤erence GMM estimation. 7 As pointed out by Bond et al.
(2001), it is quite a realistic scenario in the context of growth empirics. In practice, both problems can be detected by looking at the estimated coe¢ cient on the lagged dependent variable. Over…tting and weak instruments lead to a downward …nite sample bias, the same problem that the standard …xed e¤ects estimation su¤ers from. So if the coe¢ cient on the lagged dependent variable estimated by GMM is close to, or even below, the value obtained by the standard …xed e¤ects estimation, one has to assume the presence of over…tting and/or weak instruments. Additionally, the p-value for the Sargan test close to 1 also signals the presence of over…tting.
The system GMM estimator, developed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998), deals with the problem of weak instruments. In the case of highly persistent series, this estimator has superior …nite sample properties and achieves bet- 6 On the other hand, the …rst-order serial correlation is expected to be negative. For details see Bond (2002) and Bond et al. (2001) . 7 For a more detailed treatment of this issue see, e.g., Bond (2002) .
ter identi…cation than the di¤erence GMM estimator. 8 Intuitively, the system GMM estimator does not rely exclusively on the …rst-di¤erenced equations but also exploits information contained in the original equations in levels. 9 This proves to be especially helpful in the case of highly persistent series that are typical for the variables used in growth regressions. In the context of inequality and growth, the system GMM estimation was used, e.g., by Voitchovsky (2005) . 
Empirical Results
This section reports three sets of empirical results that are organized around three pairs of tables: Tables 1 and 2, Tables 3 and 4, Tables 5 and 6 . First, I present the results of estimating equation (1) ( Table 1) . These allow a division of countries according to their egalitarian or laissez-faire cultural background (Table 2) . Next, I show evidence for the presence of the mechanism underlying my story.
In particular, I demonstrate that a negative correlation between the changes in government interventions and the changes in inequality is stronger within egalitarian countries ( Table 3 ). The result also holds, to a somewhat lesser extent, for the changes in interventions and the changes in economic growth (Table 4) . Finally, I turn to reduced form estimates (equation 3) , showing that the inequality-growth link tends to be more positive in countries with the egalitarian cultural background (Tables 5 and 6 ).
The estimation results of (1) are reported in Table 1 Table 2 provides more detail.
[ Table 1 about here]
[ Table 2 about here]
In the story underlying this paper, governments vary the degree of state interventionism in order to meet the shifting demand for a socially acceptable level of inequality.
Simultaneously, the alternation of government interventions also a¤ects economic growth.
After identifying the cultural background of countries, I examine whether the outlined mechanism is stronger within egalitarian countries. Tables 3 and 4 provide support for this prediction by investigating the correlation patterns of …rst-di¤erenced economic variables within countries.
12 Table 3 shows that increases in government interventions are generally associated with decreases in inequality. Importantly, the negative correlation between changes in interventions and changes in inequality is stronger for the group of egalitarian countries.
The di¤erence between mean correlations of the two country groups is both quantitatively important and statistically signi…cant at the 3 per cent level.
The evidence for a negative e¤ect of an increase in government interventions on economic growth is less clear-cut but still present. Table 4 provides the details. On the one hand, there is no link between interventions and economic performance within laissez-faire countries. On the other hand, surges in interventions are associated with decelerating economic growth within egalitarian countries. 13 The di¤erence between average correlations 12 Too few data points for a given country could generate spuriously high correlations close to -1 or 1. To avoid this, only countries with at least 6 observations for …rst-di¤erenced variables are considered when computing the within correlations in Tables 3 and 4 . For that reason, the number of all countries is lower than in the growth regressions reported later. 13 Table 4 reports only the standard 95% con…dence interval, but the mean correlation for egalitarian countries is signi…cantly negative at the 6% level. Concretely, the 94% con…dence interval is (-0.295; -0.005).
in both groups is signi…cant at the 12 per cent level.
[ Table 3 about here]
[ Table 4 about here] Finally, I examine whether the relevance of countries' cultural background can still be detected in the reduced form relationship between inequality and growth. Tables 3 and 4 already a¢ rm that the culturally determined beliefs can alter the political economy mechanism driving the within-country dynamics between redistribution on the one side and inequality or growth on the other side. Given this evidence, the reduced form estimates might reveal a di¤erent pattern of inequality-growth relationship in egalitarian and laissez-faire countries. To see whether this is the case, I run a series of growth panel data regressions based on equation (3), which controls for country …xed e¤ects and thus captures the dynamics within countries. Table 5 and Table 6 Table 5 deploys the dummy version of the culture variable, which takes value one for egalitarian countries and value zero for laissez-faire ones. Table 6 relies on the continuous version of the culture variable.
[ Table 5 about here]
The …rst column of Table 5 reports the results of the standard …xed e¤ects estimation.
The coe¢ cient on the interaction term (Inequality*Culture) is positive and signi…cant at the 10% level. This means that the positive correlation between variations in inequality and variations in growth is stronger within egalitarian countries. The di¤erence is quantitatively important, as the point estimate for the coe¢ cient on the interaction term is almost double the point estimate for the inequality coe¢ cient.
To account both for the presence of a lagged dependent variable among the regressors and for the potential endogeneity of other right-hand-side variables, I turn to the GMM estimation that was developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) and improved by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) . In other words, I employ the system GMM estimation with a reduced set of instruments. As the focus of the paper lies on the interplay between culture and inequality-growth dynamics, I employ one lag of inequality and one lag of the inequality-culture interaction term as instruments. Note that both these right-hand side variables are predetermined with respect to the dependent variable, i.e. they are state variables measured at the beginning of corresponding 5-years periods of output growth. Thus, the …rst lags of these right-hand side variables satisfy the orthogonality condition for validity of the instruments in the GMM framework. Given the importance of the lagged dependent variable in this framework, I also include a second lag of the output into the instrument set. This parsimonious set of lagged variables addresses the issue of over…tting that can occur in the presence of too many instruments.
The results are shown in the second column of Table 5 . The estimated coe¢ cient for the main variable (Inequality*Culture) is still positive, con…rming a stronger positive comovement of inequality and growth within egalitarian countries. The signi…cance level for the interaction term improves from 9.9% to 7%, despite the decrease in the point estimate. The use of the system GMM thus leads to an improvement in the precision with which the di¤erence between egalitarian and laissez-faire countries can be estimated.
The Arellano-Bond tests for autocorrelation and the robust Sargan test are satis…ed.
Moreover, over…tting does not seem to be a problem with the applied instrument set, as the p-value for the Sargan test is …rmly below 1. The GMM system approach is also supposed to correct for downward bias on the coe¢ cient of the lagged dependent variable present in other within estimations. And indeed, the coe¢ cient on the lagged output is now higher than in the standard …xed e¤ects estimation.
The last column reports the results for the LSDVC estimator. As argued in Subsection 3.3, the LSDVC estimation is of particular interest in case of the macroeconomic dynamic panels like the one used in this paper. The stronger co-movement of inequality and growth within egalitarian countries survives when using this regression technique. The main variable (Inequality*Culture) is now even more signi…cant, with a p-value of 3.2%.
So far I have classi…ed every country as either egalitarian or laissez-faire. In reality, countries' cultural backgrounds can cover the whole range from strictly laissez-faire to strongly egalitarian. As yet another test, I therefore examine whether the strength of the egalitarian cultural background intensi…es the positive co-movement of inequality and growth within countries. I use the culturally determined component of peoples' belief in "luck as the main source of success in life" from the second column of Table 2 . This continuous variable is a proxy for the strength of the egalitarian cultural background in a given country. Table 6 reports the results employing this continuous cultural proxy. The speci…cation and the regression techniques (the standard …xed e¤ects, the system GMM, and the LSDVC estimation) are the same as in Table 5 , but inequality is now interacted with a continuous cultural variable rather than with a culture dummy.
The results con…rm that a stronger egalitarian cultural background generates a starker co-movement of inequality and growth within countries. The interaction term is always positive and, with the exception of the system GMM estimation, also signi…cant. The results in the …rst and third columns are even stronger than in the case of the dummy version of the culture variable. In the standard …xed e¤ects estimation, the main variable (Inequality*Culture) only narrowly misses the 5% signi…cance level, with a p-value reaching 5.7%. The highly signi…cant result for the interaction term in the case of the LSDVC regression is especially noteworthy, as this estimation approach is probably the most suitable for macroeconomic dynamic panels with a moderate cross-sectional dimension.
[ Table 6 about here]
The overall message from the reduced form regressions is that the internal dynamics of inequality and economic growth di¤er between egalitarian and laissez-faire countries.
Speci…cally, the two variables seem to be more positively correlated within countries that for cultural reasons believe that luck and good connections, rather than hard work, lead to personal success. Both the presence and the intensity of the egalitarian cultural background play an important role in shaping the joint dynamics of real economic variables like inequality and growth within countries over time.
A possible formal-theoretical framework
The presented empirical results are in accord with the mechanism proposed in this paper.
An interesting direction for future research would be to derive these empirical patterns also analytically in a formal-theoretical framework. Such a theoretical project goes beyond the scope of this paper. However, this section suggest a simple way how to think in a more formal way about the mechanism presented in this paper. In does so by introducing a straightforward extension to the theoretical model of Alesina and Angeletos (2005).
Model of Alesina and Angeletos (2005)
Alesina and Angeletos (2005) study a non-overlapping-generations model. Each generation consists of a continuum of agents, indexed by i 2 [0; 1], who live for one period. The pre-tax wealth of an agent from dynasty i and generation t is given by:
where A it denotes innate talent, e it e¤ort, it luck, and k it 1 the bequest (or more generally parental investment) of the previous generation. The agent's budget constraint writes:
with G t = t y t and y t =
where c it denotes consumption, k it is the bequest left to the next generation, w it represents the disposable wealth, t is the tax rate, G t denotes lump-sum transfers, and y t represents the mean income in generation t. Individual preferences re ‡ect both sel…sh motives and an altruistic desire for a fair social outcome:
with u it denoting the private utility, t representing the aggregate social injustice, and parameter capturing the preference for fairness. Private utility is derived from individual choices of consumption c it , parental investment k it , and e¤ort e it :
with it measuring the willingness to work and the constant
being a convenient normalization.
The overall social injustice t measures the aggregate di¤erence between the actual level of utility u it and the fair level of utility b u it across all dynasties of agents:
The fair level of utility b u it is the portion of utility achieved due to talent and e¤ort rather than luck or government transfers:
where b c it and b k it denote the fair (luck-free) levels of consumption and parental investment de…ned below.
Heterogeneity in the population is thus characterized by the distribution of (A it ; it ; it ). The optimizing agents choose consumption, e¤ort, and parental investment (c it ; e it ; k it )
to maximize the utility subject to their individual budget constraint while taking the aggregate outcomes ( t ; t ; G t ) as given. Due to the Cobb-Douglas functional form of private utility, the resulting optimal levels of consumption and parental investment become:
Accordingly, the utility of household i in generation t amounts to u it = w it
implying the following optimal level of e¤ort:
Given these outcomes of individual optimization, one can de…ne the fair levels of consumption and parental investment. Intuitively, those are the levels that would be achieved in the absence of pure luck it and social transfers. Formally:
Iterating the latter expression backwards yields the fair level of wealth, which re ‡ects the cumulative e¤ect of talent A it and e¤ort e it over the whole history of dynasty i:
Analogously, the di¤erence between actual and fair wealth w it b w it represents the overall e¤ect of luck and redistribution on the wealth accumulated by the dynasty. Furthermore, because of quasi-linearity of private utility in wealth, u it b u it = w it b w it for every i.
This implies that aggregate social injustice t = R i (u it b u it ) 2 reduces to:
Alesina and Angeletos (2005) show in the technical appendix to their paper that, for a given stationary history of taxation ( s = for all previous generations s t 1), the private utility of the median voter is given by:
and the overall level of social injustice is:
Under the assumption that the government chooses the tax rate t in order to maximize the welfare of the median agent, the optimal tax rate for the current generation is 0 =
( ; E) with:
where
The optimal tax rate is thus increasing in the di¤erence between the average and the median agent ( ), re ‡ecting the standard sel…sh motive for redistribution.
14 If the pref-erence for fairness is present ( > 0), the optimal tax rate depends also on the sources of income inequality ( 2 versus 2 ). Alesina and Angeletos focus on the fact that multiple steady states emerge in an environment with the preference for fairness. They identify two stable equilibria and call them US and EU. The US steady state is characterized by a lower taxation, fewer distortions (and thus higher output), a higher inequality, and fairer outcomes (represented by a higher ratio
) than the EU steady state.
Throughout their analysis, the authors hold all the parameters, including the strength of the fairness preference ( ), constant. It does not matter whether rich people are hard-working agents who do not owe a single cent of their wealth to pure luck ( 2 = 0). As long as the public believes that the inequality in their country has nothing to do with di¤erences in e¤ort or skills ( 2 = 0), it will expect from the government both economic growth and social equity. It is plausible to assume that a prevailing belief whether the world is a fair place ( 2 high relative to 2 )
Shocks to the Preference for Fairness
is a persistent variable dependent on cultural and ideological biases in a given country. This is also in accordance with the empirical approach in this paper, where I instrument the public beliefs by long-term cultural variables (religious composition of the country).
In the theoretical part, I thus assume that 2 and 2 are stable over time but di¤erent across countries.
By contrast, parameter is not culturally determined. It rather captures a deep human need for fairness. I assume that does not vary systematically across countries, as there is little reason to think that people in some countries are intrinsically more sel…sh than in others. However, is not perfectly stable over time, as humans are more sel…sh in some periods and less in others. For example, a median agent su¤ering from an adverse income shock could start to care more about herself than about a general notion of fairness in society. Like in a football match, the decision how fair to play ( ) is more prone to temporary shocks than the perceived rules of game ( 2 and 2 ).
When demanding a given level of redistribution, the median agent has both sel…sh ( ) and altruistic motives ( ). Allowing for ‡uctuations in peoples'desire to bring more fairness into the world has therefore consequences for the dynamics of redistribution.
Crucially, the e¤ect of a shock to the preference for fairness will depend on how unfair the median agent perceives the existing inequality in society to be in the …rst place. On the one side, the inequality originating in the heterogeneity of skills (A i ) and work ethos . In every country, the benevolent government chooses the optimal current tax t , taking the history of taxation as given. Computing the …rst order condition from (9) yields:
The application of the implicit function theorem then reveals the e¤ect of a small change in the preference for fairness ( ) on the optimal level of redistribution. To make the point clear, I focus on the extreme cases when observed inequality arises only due to heterogeneity of luck ( 2 = 0) or originates exclusively in di¤erent skills and work ethos ( 2 = 0):
2 = 0 :
In this paper's terminology, the …rst case describes egalitarian countries and the second relates to laissez-faire countries. The expressions are rather complicated, but one can identify several patterns. If the inequality is due to pure luck, an increase in the preference for fairness leads unambiguously to a higher redistribution. If di¤erent skills and work ethos are the sources of di¤erent income, then the sign of
is ambiguous.
Another matter of interest concerns the magnitude of the e¤ect. One additional assumption is needed for a meaningful analysis of this issue. The preference for fairness ( ) has to be relatively small compared to the sel…sh motive for redistribution captured 15 The general expression for the derivative
writes:
+ . This assures that the denominator in (11) remains positive and does not get close to zero. Without this additional assumption, a small change in the parameters could lead to switching of @ t @ between zero, in…nity, and minus in…nity. 16 Even if the denominator in (11) is positive, the sign of the numerator, and hence of the whole expression, remains ambiguous in the case of laissez-faire countries. Numerical simulations show that a lower level of redistribution and a higher share of wealth allocated to parental investment ( ) are associated with a negative
in countries where luck does not a¤ect the income distribution ( 2 = 0). Additionally, the absolute magnitude of
is smaller in laissez-faire countries. This holds true when parameters other than 2 and 2 are equal for both countries'groups and also if one allows for a reasonably higher level of redistribution in egalitarian countries.
In general, a preference shock thus has a smaller impact on redistribution in countries where agents observe (believe in) fair origins of inequality. Note that this di¤erent dynamics does not stem from a di¤erent preference for fairness ( ). The median agent in a laissez-faire country is no more sel…sh than the median agent in an egalitarian country.
It is rather the di¤erent perception of the sources of income heterogeneity that provides the intuition for this analytical result.
If the inequality originates in di¤ering skills and work ethos, the median voter faces a trade-o¤ between her sel…sh interest ( ) and her desire for social justice ( ). Redistribution increases her private utility by transferring wealth from the average agent. At the same time, such redistribution expropriates hard working agents with better skills and hence makes the income distribution less fair. An increase in , while holding constant, would then generate a decline in the redistribution of wealth originating in labour income.
However, the accumulated wealth of dynasties re ‡ects also redistributions that occurred in the past ( ). The undeserved component of current wealth due to those past redistri- 16 To stress the point, let us assume that the median voter does not care about her private utility at all, so that the …rst line in (9) would be equal to zero. Thus, the choice of the optimal tax rate would be driven entirely by fairness considerations captured by the parameter . Small changes in the preference for fairness could then easily translate into immense changes of the tax rate set by the benevolent government. The presence of a su¢ ciently strong sel…sh motivation thus prevents the tax rate from being implausibly sensitive to small ‡uctuations in the preference for fairness.
butions rationalizes further redistribution after an increase in the fairness preference .
This o¤setting e¤ect explains why, in laissez-faire countries with no luck heterogeneity, the derivative
has an ambiguous sign and a smaller magnitude than in the countries characterized by inequality due to luck.
If the inequality arises from pure luck, redistribution makes the income distribution more fair by tempering the income heterogeneity stemming from an unfair source. In egalitarian countries, the increase in the preference for fairness (positive shock to ) thus induces the median agent to demand more, rather than less, redistribution of labour income. Crucially, the undeserved component of dynasties'wealth due to past redistributions has now a reinforcing, rather than o¤setting, e¤ect on the derivative with a loose and ambiguous link between preference shocks and ‡uctuations in the level of redistribution. There, the dynamics of government interventions will be dominated by the allocative and stabilization roles of the state (outside the scope of the presented model) rather than by equity considerations. This has consequences for the inequalitygrowth dynamics within countries as ‡uctuations in government interventions lead to ‡uctuations in both inequality and economic growth. In egalitarian countries, with a tight link between preference shocks and changes in redistribution, the joint dynamics of government interventions, inequality, and growth will be driven to a large extent by the mechanism derived in this paper. In laissez-faire countries, with a loose and ambiguous link between preferences and redistribution, the joint dynamics of interventions, inequality, and growth will be loose as well.
What would one expect this joint dynamics -stronger in egalitarian countries, weaker in laissez-faire ones -to be? In the model, increases in the redistribution level lead to decreases in both inequality and economic growth (see Appendix A). Within egalitarian countries, there would be thus a stronger negative co-movement of redistribution and inequality as well as a stronger negative co-movement of redistribution and growth. This would imply a stronger positive co-movement of inequality and growth in those countries.
The described pattern of co-movements between government interventions, inequality, and growth would be less pronounced in countries where people see income inequality as a consequence of di¤erent skills and work ethos.
Conclusion
This paper documents a stronger dynamic interplay between government interventions, inequality, and growth in countries with the egalitarian cultural background. In particular, increases in government interventions are there associated with stronger decreases in both inequality and economic growth, compared to culturally laissez-faire countries.
This mechanism generates in turn a stronger positive co-movement between inequality and growth within egalitarian countries over time.
The presented results suggest that one should be careful when inferring causality from the positive inequality-growth link found in the within estimations without accounting for possible cultural di¤erences across countries. This re ‡ects a more general problem in the literature. Cross-sectional and within estimations are all too often regarded as alternative econometric techniques that are equally well designed to address the same questions. However, the use of the within estimation fundamentally changes the economic interpretation of the regression results. 17 This is especially true if cultural factors a¤ecting the internal political-economy process come into play.
The paper also made a more general contribution to the booming literature on culture and economics. The idea that cultural factors have a strong impact on long-run economic outcomes has meanwhile gained a broad acceptance in our profession. This paper examines a more subtle channel through which culturally determined beliefs a¤ect the economic processes. It shows that the cultural background can shape the joint dynamics of economic variables within countries over time. Here I focused on the relationship between government interventions, inequality, and growth. An interesting direction for future research could explore whether cultural factors shape the within-country dynamics of other economic variables as well.
The variance of wealth, which gives a natural measure of inequality in this model, is thus given by:
which is obviously decreasing in t .
Now we turn to the relation between redistribution and economic growth. Evaluating the pre-tax wealth (equation 4) at the optimum yields:
Aggregating output across all agents gives:
The fact that the state has a purely redistributive role (no public goods) and there is no waste in redistribution (see equation 5) implies equality between pre-tax and disposable wealth of the average agent:
Combining the last two expressions …nally yields:
where y t y t y t 1 :
Besides the standard convergence e¤ect ( 1 < 0), economic growth is also decreasing in the level of redistribution t . Table 2 . The remaining variables are de…ned in Table 5 . Column (1) reports results of the standard …xed e¤ects estimation, column (2) reports results of the system GMM estimation (Arellano and Bover 1995, Blundell and Bond 1998), and column (3) reports results of the bias-corrected Least-Squares Dummy Variables estimation (Kiviet 1995 , Bruno 2005 . Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses. Constant term is not reported. *, **, and *** denote statistical signi…cance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) 
